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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of The Case
Appellant appeals the district court's decision to dismiss his petition for
rehearing on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He seeks reversal of
the decision. For your convince Jon Gregory's Affidavit in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration is attached with exhibits.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case centers on the Stallings, hereafter Appellee or Stallings failure to
pay Jon Gregory, hereafter Appellant or Gregory for the sale of a property which
both parties agreed to develop. Gregory purchased a two-acre parcel of land in
Rexburg, Idaho for development of student housing or other university housing
development for $205,000. However, he needed the other two-acres to develop the
project. In September 2007, Stallings contacted Gregory, expressing interest in
purchasing the other two-acre parcel and going in as joint ventures in the
development of the project. Stallings obtained a bank loan in order to finance their
share of the purchase of the other two acres, for around the same price $205,000.
As the parties were working on the development in 2008, the market in residential
and commercial prope1ties crashed, causing economic tunnoil in the United States
1

and particularly to the patties in this case. Century m01igage advised Gregory they
could not provide a draw for construction work and essentially went out of
business. Summit Development had done some initial work but were unable to
complete the project. Gregory also owned an adjacent but separate prope1iy known
as G's Dairy Delights, LLC and took the proceeds from that sale and invested them
in the project (of approximately $292,629.00), to keep the venture viable. He
began working to try and sell the property to recoup the investments that he,
Appellees, and others had invested in the properties and joint venture. He was able
to locate a buyer, Rockwell Comi Limited Partnership, who was willing to
purchase the property. Then, on February 2, 2009, Gregory transferred his interest
to his parcel to Pioneer Point LLC, a company established to develop the property.
Later, on December 8, 2010, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings entered into a
construction loan with Century Mortgage Company to finance a portion of the
construction, with the work to be completed seven calendar months from that date.
On the same day, Pioneer Point LLC and the Stallings signed a promissory note of
$945,000 to multiple lenders with an agreement to pay the note within six months,
or by June 10. 2009, with the option to extend up for another six months.
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On May 2, 2012, Pioneer Point LLC transferred what had been Mr.
Gregory's property to Richard Stallings. Then, on November 14, 2012, Stallings,·
through attorney Garrett Sandow, told Gregory that he planned on taking two
draws from a sell of both parcels and would give Mr. Gregory the remaining
balance, which was $106,000 on the first draw and $150,000 on the second draw,
Exhibit M. The Stallings sold both parcels of property on December 21, 2012 to

Rockwell Court LP for $1,086,438.89. After that sale, all the mortgage investors
other than the parties were paid back their initial investments.
On September 9, 2013, Gregory was inf01med by Garrett Sandow, through
email, that Richard Stallings no longer intended to pay Gregory the balance of
those draws, Exhibit I. Mr. Sandow advised Gregory that he had four years from
the date of the notice to file suit against Stallings, which was the first time Stallings
had ever advised Gregory he did not plan on paying him. Until that date Gregory
had understood, from prior representations by Stallings that he would get his
money, albeit at the "end of the line". Exhibit M, dated November 14, 2012
establishes that Gregory would get his funds in two separate draws following
closing- one of $106,000.00 and a second draw of $150,000.00. Exhibit N, dated
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December 27, 2012 sets forth the amount that Stallings proposed paying Gregory
$155,482.28, over the next few months. Gregory fully anticipated that the draws
were still forthcoming, because of Stallings assurances, and the buyer was paying
out additional amounts after closing as the development progressed. Not all the
funds were paid at closing, but some were withheld as the development was
completed by the buyer. In addition, Stallings had advised Gregory that he would
be the last to be paid, and Gregory knew the buyer was still finishing the
development stage.
Therefore, the first he knew of Stallings decision not to pay anything
occurred on September 9, 2013. On September 6, 2017, Gregory sued the Stallings
for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case on summary judgment,
finding an oral contract did exist, but that Gregmy was barred from bringing suit
due to the four-year statute of limitations on oral contracts. On Januaty 18, 2019,
the district court denied Gregory's motion for reconsideration. Gregory timely
appealed.

4

ISSUE PRESENTED

Did the court en in denying Gregory's motion for reconsideration of
summary judgement when Gregory produced enough evidence of a
genuine dispute of a material fact, that there was not a statute of
limitation violation, and when estoppel would otherwise govern?
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The district court ened in granting Stallings' motion for summary judgment
and denying Gregory's motion for reconsideration for three reasons. First, Gregory
produced sufficient evidence about the timing of the breach of contract, which was
subsequently contradicted by Stallings, illustrating that a genuine issue of material
of fact was present. Second, though a discovery rule is not explicitly required by
statute, this Court has used such a rule in breach of contract cases and should do so
here. If the district court had correctly applied a discovery 1ule in Gregory's case,
he would not have been found baned by the statute of limitations. Finally, even if
Gregory is baned by the statute of limitations, the doctrine of either equitable
estoppel should apply in order to create an equitable outcome because Gregory
invested significantly more money into the development project and received none
5

of the payout from the sell. For these reasons, this Court should overturn the
holdings of the district court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE THE GENUINE DISPUTE OF
\VHEN THE CONTRACT WAS BREACH, THE FAILURE TO
APPLY THE DISCOVERY RULE, AND THE NEED FOR
ESTOPPEL.

A.

Standard of Review
This Court's standard of review of summary judgment is the same as the

district court's review and is governed by I.R.C.P 56. Balivi Chem. Corp. v. Indus.

Ventilation, Inc., 131 Idaho 449, 450, 958 P.2d 606, 607 (Ct. App. 1998). This
Court must determine if the documents on file with the Court illustrate a genuine
dispute of material fact. Id. Further all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record must be drawn in favor ofnonmoving party, Gregory. Lockheed

Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644
(2006).
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B.

Gregory provided sufficient evidence that a material issue of fact arises
about when the contract was breached.
The district court correctly determined that there was a valid, oral contract

between Gregory and Stallings which was governed by a four-year statute of
limitations. See LC. § 5-217. However, the district court incorrectly ruled that no
genuine dispute of fact arose regarding when the breach of contract occurred.
Statute of limitations do not begin to toll until the claim has accrued, which in this
case would be at the contract breach. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890
P.2d 714, 721 (1995). This Court has also recognized that the time a breach
occurred is a factual question. Id.
Two cases are instructive in illustrating the factual nature of the time of
breach. First in the partnership context, the Court of Appeals found that a dispute
about whether the partnership contract ended at the dissolution of the partnership
or at the completion of winding up the company was genuine dispute of fact that
could not be disposed of on summary judgment. Heilson v. Cook, l 08 Idaho 236,
238, 697 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Ct. App. 1985).
Second, this Court has recently reaffinned the longstanding doctrine in
Idaho conceining time for contract performance when the time is not specified.
7

Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209,213 409 P.3d 789, 793 (2017).
In Swafford, this Court held that when a contract does not specify a performance
date, then time for performance is a reasonable amount of time. Id. In Swafford,
couple contracted to buy a piece of land, relying on a master plan for development
of the surrounding area. Consttuction in 2007-2008 did not confmm to the master
plan, but the couple did not sue until 2015 which was two years outside the statute
of limitations. The court refused to make a 1uling on when the couple had
constructive notice of the breach but stated that at the latest the breach occurred
was in 2008 when the construction was completed.
Principles in both these cases apply here. Gregory left the closing up of the
finances to Stallings. When Stallings communicated to Gregory that he would be
sending payments in two draws, no time was specified. The district court, pointed
to a statement, sent on December 27, 2012, as the time Gregory should have been
expected to pay. The court reasoned that on that date, since Gregory was not paid,
he should have been put on notice that Stallings did not intend to pay. However,
Gregory had been informed by Stallings that he would not be paid until other
paiiies, including Stallings himself had been paid first. In addition the buyer had
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withheld funds from closing to finish the development and therefore the parties
were waiting on the receipt of additional payments or draws through the first part
of 2013. The financial statement was an affirmation of the amount that Gregory
would receive, but Gregory reasonably believed that payouts to others would occur
before he received that payment. If there was other evidence that would have made
Gregory believe that Stallings was not going to follow through with the contract,
Stallings did not present that evidence to the court.
The court erred in using the financial statement as the date of breach of
contract instead of the reasonable amount of time for performance as iterated by
this Comi in Swafford. Like in Swafford, where the comi refused to rule when
there was a constructive notice of the breach, here, there is genuine dispute that the
latest the breach occurred was when Gregory received the email from Sandow.
This proposition is further bolstered by Neilson. Like Neilson, where parties
disagreed when the contract was dissolved, here, Gregory has presented evidence
that the breach occmred when he discovered Stalling's intent not to pay him. His
belief was not only an individual subjective belief of his own, but was confirmed
by his attorney, Mr. Sandow, when Mr. Sandow informed him of the statute of
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limitations on a breach of oral contract. The fact that Stallings disagrees with the
date of breach, illustrates a genuine dispute of material fact. Because a genuine
dispute of material fact exists, this Court should ove1tm11 the lower comt's grant of
summary judgment.
C.

Gregory's claim did not violate the statute of limitations because a discovery
rule should be applied in this case.
The lower comt also eITed in dete1mining when the breach of contract

occu1Ted, because a breach date based on Gregory's discovery is appropriate in this
case. While there is no explicit discovery rule governing the breach of oral
contracts, this Court has essentially applied such a rule in some breach of contract
cases.
For example, in Spence, a couple who left a development project in the
hands of a real estate agent in Idaho and moved to California in 1986 under the
belief the real estate agent was moving forward in development. 126 Idaho at 767.
Though the patties agreed to go into development in 1980, the couple learned from
a family member that the real estate agent was not moving forward with
development in 1988 and that point sued for breach of contract. Id. at 769. This
Comt found that the breach occuITed when the couple discovered the development
10

was not going forward, not when the real estate agent staited actually violating the
contract by taking actions that were not in line with development of the prope1ty
which had occurred many years earlier. Id. at 770.
Like the couple in Spence, Gregory was unaware of Stallings intent to
breach the contract until notified by a third party. Though Stallings may have taken
actions that indicated an intent to breach the contract, Gregory did not lmow of
those actions. While the lower comi used the financial statement from December
27 as evidence that Gregory should have lmown that Stallings would breach the
. contract, the fact that Stallings was giving Gregory an update on the status of the
sale cuts in the opposite direction. The statement was confi1mation that Stallings
did intend to still pay Gregory. Gregory indicated that up until the email from Mr.
Sandow, he was received multiple reassurances that he would be still paid. Further,
Gregory lmew that some construction by the buyer would delay the final payout
until spring and summer of 2013. These facts show Gregory had no reason to
believe that Stallings would not uphold his end of the promise.
In the case of the Spence couple, two years had passed where the couple was
not actively looking into the property, and this Court still held in their favor. So
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should the Comt do here. Gregory learned of the intention to breach less than a
year after the sale of the property, and was, until that time, under the belief that
Stallings would fulfill his promise. A discovery rule is fitting, where Gregory had
no reason to suspect that Stallings would breach the contract. Because a discovery
rule should have been applied, Gregory is not in violation of the statute of
limitations.
D.

Even if Gregory violated the statute of limitations, his case should still be
heard under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Statute of limitations may be overcome through the doctrine of equitable

estoppel. Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius X, 413 Idaho 538, 541, 149 P.3d 813, 816
(2006). Equitable estoppel, which can be applied in Gregory's case, is established
by showing:
( 1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual
or constructive knowledge of the t1uth; (2) that the paity asserting
estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied
upon; (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from
whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the
representation or concealment to his prejudice. Id. at 541.
The district court did not address this issue in its ruling on summary
judgment, but if this Comt affirms the district court's decision Stallings will be
12

unfairly enriched for his breach of contract. Gregory invested more than double the
financial resources of Stallings and Gregory also invested more time, labor, and
services than Stallings. So, Gregory will receive nothing for these investments,
because of misrepresentations by Stallings.
Looking tq the equitable estoppel factors, first it appears that Stallings told
Gregory that he would send him payment for the sale, while never intending to
follow through with that promise. Second, Gregory had no way of discovering the
truth about the sale because the property had been transferred out of Gregory's
name. Third, Stallings made representations to Gregory likely with the intention to
avoid Gregory bring suit. Finally, Gregory relied on those representation to his
detriment, as he was never paid for the sale of the property. All these facts show
that Gregory's case should be heard on its merits regardless of the statute of
limitations.
Fmiher, equitable estoppel should apply in this case because Gregory did
diligently pursue the suit after discovery of the breach of contract. Under Ferro,
equitable estoppel does not eliminate the statute of limitations, instead it prevents a
party from asserting it as a defense for a reasonable time after the patiy claiming
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estoppel could have reasonably discovered the truth. 143 Idaho at 540. In Ferro,
the court determined that equitable estoppel did not apply to a priest who filed his
claim for infliction of emotional distress after the two-year statute of limitations
period. Id. There, the cowi determined that the priest !mew the statute of
limitations on his claim, and in fact consulted multiple att01neys about his case, so
there was no reason that he should have not timely filed. Id. at 544.
While the statute of limitations had not tolled when Gregory discovered the
breach of contract, his case was very different from the priest in Ferro. Gregory
was wrongfully told the statute of limitations for filing a case by attorney, Mr.
Sandow. Gregory believed that he was pursing his case within the statute of
limitations. Because Gregory believed that he was timely filing, based on
information from an attorney, he showed that he was diligently pursuing his case.
If Gregory had attempted to file after what he !mew to the statute of limitations, it

would be obvious that the reasonable time to raise equitable estoppel had passed
because the action would have shown a lack of diligence to conform with the suit's
procedural requirements.
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Gregory has shown that he meets the elements to qualify for equitable
estoppel and that he still has reasonable time to prevent Stallings from using the
statute of limitations as a defense. At the very least, whether equitable estoppel
applies in this case is a genuine issue of material fact which would require this
Court to overturn the lower court's holding.
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence and argument presented herein, Gregory respectfully
requests that this Court overturn the decision of the district comi.
DATED this 22 nd day of July 2019.

DAVID N. PARMENTER, ESQ
Attorney for the Petitioner/Appellent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of July 2019, served two true
and c01rect copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by placing the copies
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

JARED M. HARRIS
Baker & Harris
266 W. Bridge St.
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
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Subj:
Rexburg Property
,
Date:
11114/2012 10:24:26 AM, Mountain Standard Time
From:
staterecoverv@hotrnail.com
·
To:
Gsandowlaw@aol.com
Garrett Sandow
The following facts are the reasons why the.payoff op the Rexburg property should be alocated as
stated.
· ,,
' ·
·
1. My principle and interest paid out at the time my bank went broke was 287,000.

2. When my bank, America West closed down I had fhe F.D.I.C. come aftet' me threatening to go after
everything that I have. Nlether Larkins or John had any Interest or financial responsability In helping me
at all. Just because Iwas able to get out of that problem does not mean that I share that risk with
John.
·
3, Tim Cobb told me he was really dlsapplonted in dJallng with John because he could not get him to
follow through In a promptly time, He commended m'e for getting things back In a efficient time. Tim
Cobb told me that he would not have any future deallpgs with John.
I'

•

I

4. This entire project was under John watch. I totally; left everything up to his dlsgression. I am very
disappointed that we sold this property <1nder his advi_sment to some one who barrowed hard money on
it, This ruined potential profits thst would have beeri good for both of us.

·1I

5, Since this property has drug on, I have been forc d to sell some other property at a discount for

_need capital on a project In Caldwell.
Conclusion

My mistake was putting this In Johns hands. I feal If he would have been more ascertlve wa would not
be In this position. For this reason I feal that Ishould at least get the mane that I Invested Into this
property back.
.!J: gt, 1. eo-o •0-D \
Investment

.

• 286,000.

!ti

,Li) Cl I b IHD
'
3 o 1 'C> 0-D

-

.
---+-------------~"

I recleved a draw
30,000. ....
,...,;b;a:la~nc:::;e::d..'.:le'.:'.fl:::___ _ _ _ _ __.:.2~5:5~,o:o'.'.'.o:..

'

I plan on takinQ the following amounts and then glvlnr the balance of each draw to Garret Sandow for
Johns dlspersel.
,
.
First draw
106,000
.
·
second draw 150,00D
t ti o

j

·
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Monday, November 19, 2012 AOL: Gsandowlaw

Electronically Filed
10/29/2018 3:55 PM

Seventh Judicial District, Bingham County
Pamela W, Eckhardt, Clerk of the Court
By: Emilie Loveland, Deputy Clerk

DAVID N. PARMENTER
NATHAN D. RJVERA
Attorney at Law
53 S. Shilling
PO Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-5618
(208)785-4858 FAX
parlaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

JON GREGORY, an individual

)

)
Plaintiff,
VS,

)
)

Case No, CV-2017-1651

)

AFFIDAVIT OF JON GREGORY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

)
RJCHARD STALLINGS, an individual and )
EILEEN STALLING, an individual
)
Defendants.
)

Jon Gregory being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1. I am the plaintiff in this matter.
2. I was aware of the closing scheduled on December 21, 2012, but knew that I had no
money due at that time, because of further conditions, development, and draws. The agreement
under the Real Estate Option Agreement with Memphis Development Group (Exhibit X),
provided for a purchase price of$800,000, as well as reimbursement to me and Stallings for
reimbursement of engineering costs and existing infrastrncture in the sum of $300,000, which
"cost shall be paid no later than 50% completion of the final development."
3. Exhibit N specifies that Stallings did receive some payment and credits around the

time of closing~but :fuliher specifies that we would be receiving draws in January or early
Febrnary 2013.
4. The constrnction project took longer to complete than anticipated, thus delaying the
payouts or draws to me and Stallings for several months, well into 2013. The draws were sent
directly to Stallings, but it was my understanding that there were several smaller draws paid out
over the spring and summer of 2013. Ftuther, Stallings had advised me that I would receive my
money last--from the final draw or draws.
5. I continued to receive information regarding the progress of the development and
assurances that the draws would be forthcoming through 2013, until I actually received
information by email from Stallings to Tim Cobb and fmwarded to Mr. Sandow (as of
September 9, 2018) that he did not intend to pay me, as he previously had agreed (Exhibit I).
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Dated thisli day of (} C.-fo fJJf::Jt'_, 2018.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County o f ~ )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

My cmn exprs:

n . . j \1a/ z.. 7-

~ day of J)c.,-\t>~

Notary Public in and for the
State ofld~o,residing at::?"
therein

':Yoe <l..\ein
MARITZA WHITE
1·
NOTARY PUBLIC• STATE OF IDAIIO
COMMISSION NUMBER 6il029
;
g,,,1......;M;;;Y_.Cj,,OM,;;M..,l8i iSIO.;.N..ei,ixP,..IR..
ES.,;1;;.2·""'1~2~....,.:;

, 2018.

EXHIBIT I

rage 1 or 1

From: Tim Cobb <tlm@Con~tructlonanhancement.com>
TC\: (3~andowfaw <Gsandowlaw@aof.com>
subject: Fwd: Re_xburg Property

Date: Mon, Sep 9, 2013 5:26 pm
GarrettHope you are doing well... I received the below from Richard Stallings in the past few weeki\, and then
.
followed up with a call to him and conversation, In which he mentioned some of the items that went Wrong In·
this deal.
Give me a call when you get a moment.
509-990-2324
Sent from Tim's !Pad
Begin forwarded message: .
From: "State Recovery, Inc.. " <staterecovery@hotmaif.com:>
Oate:.August27, 2013, 2:01:42 PM PDT
To: Tim Cobb <tlm@Constructionenharicement.com>
Subject: Rexburg Prop!Jr!y

Tim I have been_ doing a lot of thinking i~ reference to John Gregory and the sale of the Rexburg
property. When John had !he IRS•call me It really caught me. off guard. In that they asked me if I
had anything to do with John Gregory aM I assured them that we had no partnership and· that I
owed him no money In this transaction. IThen shortly after that John told me that In selling of tlie
property Ihat the buyer only wanted to deal with one person not two, I thought th·at was strange .
but said nothing at that time. Latter I learned that the whole reason for this is because the IRS Is
after John for past taxes. I am very unhappy with John In trying to put me in the middle' of his
problems .. As I• review this entire projecfl was no more than an Investor In that John made all the
decisions on this property. !he only·thlng I did Is purchase my ground and John thought he .could
market It. About two years ago John call~d up and said for us to go up to Rexburg and sign some
papers. We tlioughtwe'ws're sailing theiproperty and when we got up to Rexburg they had us
sign a guarantee for 950,000A'lO. The closing agent said we were In good shape and It was a
normal procedure, John should have said something to me. I am upset that John allowed this
project.to borrow hard money that took all tbe profits .. I look at the opportunity cost of this project
that was given away through Johns poor management of this.property, I feel that I should get the·
full opportunity cost back on my risk of my Investment. Beside the opportunity cost, by John ..
having, me talk to the IRS put ma In a position that I am very uncomfortable with. I feel John is .
way out of line In putting me In any position that could threaten
financial position. In
conclusion I feel In order for me to get a return on my Investment there Is no money owed to John
from the current sell.
·

my

Thank you
Richard Stallings

STATE RECOVERY
IOOMARKLN
BLACKFOOT, ID 83221
208-785-6591

http://mail.aol.com/38022-111/aol-6/en-us{maillPrintMessage,aspx
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EXHIBITX

X
REAL ESTATE OPTION AGREEMENT
Contr<\ct ID #VP1108

THIS REAL ESTATE OPTION AGREEMENT (the "Option Agreement") is entered
into as of July 19, 2011 by and between John Grego[).! and or Assigns ("Seller") located at
P.O .. Box 1296 Blackfoot, ID 8322, and Memphis Development Group, its successors
apd/or assigns ("Purchaser"), located at 411 O Eaton Avenue, Suite A Caldwell, Idaho.
83607.
NOW THEREFORE. in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and
other valuable consideration received. Seller is willing to grant Purchaser an Option to
purchase the Option Prope_rty on the terms and conditions set forth herein:
1.

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION:
The property is located at and is described as Four (4) + acres on the Norjh side of
west ]1h South commonly known as Pioneer Pointe in Rexburg, Idaho (full legal
description to be included in final closing documents agreeable to Purchaser), an
recorded plat, see 'Exhibit N, together with all of Seller'.s right. title. and interest in all
common areas, amenities, appurtenances, fixtures, chattels, mineral rights and the
underlying fee land (collectively referred to as the "Option Property").

2.

GRANT OF OPTION:
Seller hereby grants to Purchaser the exclusive right and option to purchasa the
Option Property on the terms and conditions set forth herein ("the Option").

3.

PURCHASE PRICE:
The purchase price shall be l;;ight Hundred Thousand ($800,000.00) Dollars. In
addition Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for c_ost of engineering plans and existing
infrastructure a sum of Three Hundred Thousand ($300,000.00) Dollars, said cost
shall be paid no later than 50% completion of the final development. Third party
verification of percentage completion shall be approved by both Purchaser and Seller.
In addition said cost shall be carried out under the terms of an AIA contract between
the Purchaser and Seller to be completed at land closing.

4.

EXERCISE OF OPTION:
The Purchaser ·may exercise the Option at any time after the execution of this Option
Agreement and prior to the expiration of the Option Term by notifying Seller of its
intent to exercise the Option.

5.

OPTION TERM:
The term of the Option shall commence upon execution of this Option Agreement and
automatically expire if the Option' is not exercised by December 31"\ 2011 or extended
· as provided in Section 11 herein.
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6.

OPTION PAYMENT:
A Five thousand ($5,000.00) Dollar Option Payment shall be placed in Purchaser's
,;igent's trust account in the form of a note upon execution of the Option Agreement by
Seller and Purchaser. Upon Purchaser's acceptance and approval of all items listed
under "Initial Due Diligence Items" in Section 8 and upon receipt of approvals for
financing and other items as listed in Section 9, "Conditions Precedent to Option
Payment," the Option Payment shall be deemed nonrefundable, Said time to meet
these requirements not to exceed December 15th 2011. Purchaser shall notify Seller in
writing indicating the election to proceed and will release the Five Thousand
($5,000.00) Dollar note Option Payment (the "Option Payment") to the Seller. The
Option Payment shall be applied against the Purchase price as of the Closing Date.

7.

INITIAL DUE DILIGENCE PERIOD:
Purchaser shall have one hundred fifty (145) days following the receipt from Seller of
the "Initial Due Diligence Items" listed below to review said items and notify the Seller
In writing of (a) its approval and acceptance of the Initial Due Diligence items, which
approval and acceptance shall not be unreasonably withheld, and its election to
proceed, or (b) if one or more of the Initial Due Diligence Items are not unacceptable,
the reason(s) for not approving such ilem(s). In the event any such items are
unacceptable to Purchaser, Seller shall have 10 business days following receipt of
Purchaser's notificiation to notify Purchaser of any actions it intends to take to address
the unapproved item to Purchaser's satisfaction. If any such item remains unapproved
by Purchaser for any reason, Purchaser shall have the option of waiving the item and
electing to proceed, or terminating this Option Agreement. In the event Purchaser
elects not to continue this transaction during the initial Due Diligence Period, then this
Option Agreement shall be null and void and all option notes or payments shall be
returned to the Purchaser and neither party shall have any further liability or
responsibility related to this transaction.

8.

INITIAL DUE DILIGENCE:
No later than 15 business days foll\)wing execution of this Option Agreement Seller
shall provide Purchaser with:
A. A preliminary title commitment including copies of all easements 1;1nd other
agreements in effect with respect to all or a portion of the Property, all permits, all
tax statements and notices of actual or proposed adjustment of tax valuations,
and all appraisals, topographical maps, geotechnical or soil studies, feasibility
studies, engineering studies, utility locations, environmental and Hazardous
Materials reports and studies and other reports and studies relative to the Option
Property or its use or development In Seller's possession and/or control;

B. Copies of all correspondence in Seller's possession and/or control with all
· governmental entities relative to the Option Property;
·
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C. A copy of all current leases, maintenance/service contracts and agreements, and
any other contracts relating to the ownership, operation and maintenance of the
Option Property, if any;
D. Evidence as to local improvement districts and governmental assessments
affecting the Option Property and proposed assessments and easements.
9.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO OPTION PAYMENT:
Conditions precedent to making the Option Payment non-refundable shall include:
A. Zoning:

The Option Property is currently zoned (Medium Residential 2}. Purchaser wishes
to develop the Option Property as Mum-Family Apartments. The Purchaser's
proposed development shall Gonsist of a minimum of §Qm((fil!) units of residential
apartment housing units. This Option Agreement is contingent upon the
.
completion of all planning and zoning approvals required by the City of Rexburg
and all other government entities having jurisdiction over the proposed
development for said density requirement, Seller to support the proposed use.
Purchaser's application for such approvals shall not be unnecessarily delayed.
B. Entitlements:
All federal, state, county and city permits, approvals and licenses necessary for
Purchaser's Intended development of the Property including any zoning changes,
annexations, site plan approvals, variances or platting required (including legal
access to the parcel). This shall be deemed to include confirmation of the
availability to the Option Property at reasonable expense of water, sewer, gas,
power, telephone, cable and all other necessary utilities, but does not include the
building permits required for construction of the proposed development.
C. financing:
Commitments for all financing including but not limited to Low Income Housing
Tax Credits, Federal HOME funds, other HUD or USDA funding, Federal Home
Loan Bank loans and/or grants, construction and permanent loans, and
investment partnership approvals. It is expressly understood that said
commitments will be contingent upon completion and approval of a Phase 1
Environmental Site Assessment and, if direct federal funding is involved, a federal
environmental review conducted in accordance with the National Environmental
Policies Act of 1969 (NEPA).
10. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR CLOSING:
In addition to the conditions described in Section 9, which shall be conditions
precedent for closing as well as conditions precedent for making the Option Payment
non-refundable, the following conditions shall be additional conditrons for closing:
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A. Survey:
Purchaser's receipt and review, at Purchaser's expense, of an acceptable
ALTA survey of the Option Property from a licensed surveyor, and
Purchaser's approval of the same, which shall not be unreasonably withheld.
B. Deed: ·
Purchaser's receipt and appoval, which shall not be unreasonably withheld, of a
good arid sufficient warranty, free of all liens and encumbrances not previously
approved by Purchaser, except: for:

1. All easements, rights of way, covenants and restrictions of record approved by
Purchaser.
2. Current and future year's real estate taxes.
3. Assessments existing as of the date of this Option Agreement.
4. Zoning and other governmental laws and regulations provided none of the
foregoing interfere with the intended use of the Option Property by Purchaser.
C. Status of Property:
As ofttie closing date, the Subject Property shall be free of all occupants. tenants
and personal possessions of Seller.
D. Condition of Property:
Purchaser's acceptance of the physical condition of all improvements located on
the Option Property; if any exist. Seller agrees to allow Purchaser reasonable
access to all improvements for the purpose of a physical inspection by Purchaser
and Purchaser's representatives. In the event Seller cannot deliver to Purchaser
good and marketable title to the Option Property. or the conditions of
Improvements on the Option Property; if any exist, do not meet Purchaser's
approval upon final inspection, Purchaser shall have the option of waiving the item
and electing to proceed, or terminating this Option Agreement. In the event
Purchaser notifies Seller that Purchaser will not continue this transaction, then this
Option Agreement shall be null and void and all option notes and payments shall
be returned to the Purchaser and neither party shall have any further liability or
responsibility related to this transaction.
11. EXTENSION OF OPTION:
Purchaser shall be granted up to two (2) extensions of Sixty (60) days each to clrn,e
the transaction upon the deposit of an additional Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollar
cash Option Payment for each extension (the "Extension Payment''). Said Extension
Payment(s) shall be released to seller on the first of each extension month to be
deemed nonrefundable at that time. These option payments shall also be applied
against the Purchase price as of the Closing Date.
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12. ASSIGNMENT:
Purchaser shall have the right, after giving written notice to Seller, to assign its rights
under this Option Agreement to any entity controlled by, or under common control of
the Purchaser. Should the proposed use change from multifamily apartments, Sellers
written approval shall be required.
13. RIGHT TO ENTER:
Seller agrees to provide access to the Property to Purchaser, Purchaser's agents,
inspectors and engineers or surveyors for the purpose of determining the suitability of
the Property for the Purchaser's purposes. Purchaser shall be allowed to perform
surveys, environmental and geotechnical testing, water and soils testing or any other
studies or testing deemed neoessary on the Property, with Seller's standard form of
indemnity as addressed in the Option Agreement. Purchaser shall in no event allow
liens to be placed on the property prior to closing and shall be responsible for insuring
their own contractors and employees.
14. TITLE COMPANY:
Title and escrow shall be handled by Pioneer Title Company.
15. CLOSING:
Closing shall occur according to the usual and customary closing procedures in effect
in Madison County, Idaho, within 30 days of the date that Purchaser notifies Seller of
its intent to close, however; no later than January 15th. 20.16, (unless extended as
indicated in Section 11 herein).
16. CLOSING COSTS:
Seller shall pay the costs of a standard coverage title insurance policy, transfer or sale
taxes, and any title curative work it elects to undertake and all real estate sales
commissions. Purchaser shall pay recording fees, cost of additional title insurance
required by lenders and/or investors and all costs in connection with physical
inspections, and any other investigations made in connection with Purchaser's Due
Diligence Review, including additional Engineering Fees required by the development
only agreed upon in advance in writing. The Purchaser and Seller shall pay for their
own respective attorney fees. All escrow fees shall be paid equally by Purchaser and
Seller, except as otherwise provided in the Option Agreement.
17. NOTICES:
All notices and other communications provided for in this Option Agreement shall be in
writing, effective on the date hand delivered, sent by facsimile, or mailed by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed as below, or to
such other address as the parties may designate to the other parties in writing.
PURCHASER:

SELLER:

Community Development, Inc.

.Jon C Gregory
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411 O Eaton Avenue, Suite A
Caldwell, Idaho 83607
Attn: C. Fred Cornforth, CEO

P.O. Box 1296
Blackfoot. ID 83221
Attn: Jon C Gregory

18. BROKER COMMISSION/ MULTI STATE REFFERAL FEE:
Seller agrees to pay a Three (3%) percent commission of the final sales price, NOT
including any reimbursable items as stated in section 3 herein, payable at closing, to
Tim Cobb Broker of Vantage Partners LLC.
19. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: NO WAIVER:
Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Option Agreement. Any
extensions of deadlines set forth in this Option Agreement must be agreed to in writing
by both parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Option Agreement:
(a) performance under each paragraph of this Option Agreement which references a
date shall be required by 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time on the stated date; and
(b) the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the
day following the event which triggers the time requirement.
in the event that the date upon which any action is to be taken pursuant to this Option
Agreement is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the action may be taken upon the
next business day. No waiver of the breach of any provision of this Option Agreement
shall be construed as a waiver of any preceding or succeeding breach of the same or
any other provision of this Option Agreement.
20. PURCHASER'S DEFAULT:
Upon default by Purchaser and subsequent termination of this Option Agreement by
Seller, Seller may, as its sole remedy, retain any non-refundable Option Payment and
any additional cash Extension Payments deposited by Purchaser as liquidated
damages.
21. SELLER'S DEFAULT:
Upon default by Seller, Purchaser may enforce this Option Agreement and pursue any
and all remedies available at law or equity, including taking action for specific
performance and damages.
22. FEDERAL FUNDS:
Purchaser hereby informs Seller that Purchaser or Purchaser's successor or assignee
may utilize federal funds with respect to the acquisition of the Option Property.
Because federal funds may be so used, Purchaser discloses to Seller as follows:
A,. This sale is voluntary. The Purchaser, or its .successor or assignee, is not a
governmental entity and does not possess the power of eminent domain.
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B. Purchaser estimates the fair market value of the Option Property to be
Purchaser's proposed purchase price of Eight Hundred Thousand ($800,000.00)
Dollars.
23. SELLER'S WARRANTIES: INDEMNITY:
A If, prior to closing, Seller becomes aware of any fact or circumstance which would
materially change a representation, then Seller will immediately give notice of
such changed fact or circumstance to Purchaser, but such notice shall not relieve
the Seller of its liabilities or obligations hereunder.
B, Seller shall issue a certificate at the closing stating that all of Seller's
representations and warranties are true and correct as of said date, except as to
facts, if any, concerning which Purchaser was previously notified in writing.
C. If Seller gives notice of a material change prior to closing, Purchaser shall have
the right without penalties to terminate the Option Agreement and have the
deposited promissory note and Option Payment and all interest thereon
immediately returned without further liability. Seller shall reimburse Purchaser-for
its due diligence costs incurred in connection with this Option Agreement within
ten (10) days after presentment ofa schedule thereof to Seller.
D. Seller shall indemnify, defend, anq hold Purchaser harmless from and against any
and all losses, claims, fines, penalties, causes of action, suits, losses, costs,
expenses (including attorneys' fees), and damages arising from or out of the
inaccuracy of Seller's representations or warranties herein or a breach of its
covenants hereunder and shalf pay all of Purchaser's costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing this duty to indemnify
and hold harmless, up until closing and recording of the property in Canyon
County.
E. Seller shall provide Purchaser at closing any and all bui!ding plans, specifications
and inspection reports pertaining to this sale not already provided hereunder.
.
24. SELLER REPRESENTATION TO PURCHASER:
As an Inducement to Purchaser to enter this transaction, Seller makes the following
representations, warranties and agreements.

A The Option Property and Seller's use and occupancy thereof do not, to the best of
Seller's knowledge, and will not at closing, violate any applicable covenant,
condition or restriction or any applicable statute, ordinance, regulation, order,
permit, rule, agreement or law, including, without limitation, any building, zoning,
hazardous or toxic waste, health or environmental restrlction or any governmental
requirement concerning fjll, use, construction, maintenance, repair, replacement,
operation or occupancy of the Option Property.
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To the best of Seller's knowledge, no hazardous or toxic waste or other hazardous
or toxic material or substance has been deposited .or spilled on or under or
rel(;"lased from the Option Property or exists on or under the Option Property. Any
Hazardous Wastes removed from the property by the previous or current owner
have been properly disposed of and are not or will not become the responsibility
of any Purchaser. Seller hereby indemnifies Purchaser from any claim arising
from the disposal of any Hazardous Materials in the past.
B. Seller has not received any notice of the existence of any current violation of any
applicable covenant, condition or restriction or any applicable statute, ordinance,
regulation, order, permit, rule or law, including, without limitation, any building,
zoning or environmental restriction or requirement concerning filling, use,
construction, maintenance, repair, replacement, operation or occupancy of the
Option Property which has not been disclosed to Purchaser and will not have
been resolved to Purchaser's satisfaction.
C. There are no obligations in connection with the Option Property which will be
binding upon Purchaser after closing, except the leases, loan obligations and
those other agreements relative to the Option Property which Purchaser elects in
writing to assume closing.

at

D. To the best of Seller's knowledge, there is no plan, study or effort being made by
any governmental or quasi-governmental authority or agency or any nongovernmental person.
E. There is no written or oral agreement which will prevent or impede Seller's timely
and full performance of all of Seller's obligations under this Option Agreement.

F. There are no assessments for public improvements or other governmental or
quasi-governmental fees, charges or assessments, except real property taxes,
levied against or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, threatened with respect to the
Option Property or its use.
G. All permits and approvals required for the Option Property's·present use and
status have been obtained and all conditions contained therein have been
satisfied, except as set forth in paragraph (A) above.
H. There are no claims, <1ctions, suits or governmental investigations or proceedings
existing or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, threatened against or involving the
Option Property (including, without limitation any condemnation or eminent
domain proceeding or matter related to the formation of or assessment by a local
improvement district), except as set forth in paragraph (A) above.
I.

Any and all agreements with third parties with respect to the Option Property,
. including, but not limited to, brokerage agreements, management agreements,
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maintenance agreements and janitorial agreements will be canceled by Seller
upon closing without cost, penalty or expense to Purchaser, unless otherwise
specifically authorized by Purchaser in writing.
J.

To Seller's knowledge, there are no attachments, executions, or assignments for
the benefit of creditors, or voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy or under any other
debtor relief laws contemplated by or pending or threatened by or against Seller or
the Option Property that could affect the Option Property or Seller's transfer of the
Option Property.

K. All insumnce policies now maintained <;>n the Option Property will be kept in effect,
up to and including the closing. Seller has received no notice from any insurance
company or rating organization of any defects in the condition of the Option
Property, or of conditions that would prevent the continuation of existing coverage
or would increase the present rate of premium.

L. All documentation heretofore or hereafter furnished to the Purchaser relative to
the Option Property is true, complete and correct, contains no factual inaccuracies
and accurately represents all factual matters stated therein.

M. No representation made by Seller contains any untrue statement of material fact
or fails to state a material fact necessary in order to make statements contained
therein not misleading or necessary in order to provide a prospective Purchaser of
the Option Property with adequate information as to the Option Property.
25. ATTORN§Y'S FEES:
In the event of any litigation, both parties agree to submit to binding mediation as a
means of conflict resolution between the parties relating to this Option Agreement.
The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses incurred,
including reasonable attorney's fees, if any.

26. ENTIRE AGREEMENT:
This Agreement contains the entire Option Agreement and understanding between the
parties and is subject to no understandings, conditions or representations that are not
set forth herein. This Option Agreement may only be amended in writing and signed
by both parties. Time is of the essence in the performance of this Option Agreement.
27. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY:
Each individual, corporation or agency signing this Option Agreement as Seller and
Purchaser shall be jointly and severally liable for the performance of every term and
condition of this Option Agreement.
28. INVALID PROVISION:
If any provision of this Option Agreement shall be invalid or unenforceable, the
remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
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29. PARTIES BOUND:
This Option Agreement shall be !,)inding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the
parties and their respective heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
30. GOVERNING LAW:
This Option Agreement shall be goverhed by and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the State of Idaho.
31. CAPTIONS:
The captions 1n this Option Agreement are inserted only for convenience and in no
way construe or interpret the provisions hereof or affect their scope or intent.

32. RIDERS:
The riders and exhibits or addendums, if any, attached hereto, signed and initialed by
the parties are made a part of this Option Agreement hereof.

33. MULTIPLE ORIGINALS:
This Option Agreement may be executed as facsimile originals and each copy of this
Option Agreement bearing the facsimile transmitted signature of any party's
authorized representative shall be deemed to be an original. Notwithstanding the
validity of the facsimile originals, it is intended that this Option Agreement be manually
executed in two originals and that each party shall receive a fully executed original.
34. ACCEPTANCE: This Option agreement is made subject to the acceptance of Seller
and Buyer on or before (Date) August 1ih 2011 at 5:00 pm (MST). If acceptance of
this Option agreement is no received within the time specified, the offer is withdrawn
and the entire Earnest/ Option Money, if any, shall be refunded to Buyer on demand.
Seller acknowledges receipt of a completely filled in copy of the option agreement which
the Seller has fully read and has had all desired opportunity to review with an attorney of
his/her/its choosing. In the event that the Purchaser fails to complete the Purchase as
herein provided, the Option Payment shall be distributed as follows: After deduction of any
title insurance and escrow cancellation charges, the Option Payment shall be distributed
100% to Seller.
PURCHASER:
Memphis Development Group
By:---------Its:

----------

SELLER:

Afr=
Z/1=r
:Jo10
By:

Its:

q'Rt;:'Gpv~Y

----------
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